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AbstractIn a market for a homogeneous good where firms are identical, compete in quantities and produce with constant returns, the
percentage of welfare losses (PWL) is small with as few as five competitors for a class of demand functions which includes linear
and isoelastic cases. We study markets with positive fixed costs and asymmetric firms. We provide exact formulae of PWL and
robust constructions of markets were PWL is close to one in these two cases. We show that the market structure that maximizes
PWL is either monopoly or dominant firm, depending on demand. Finally we prove that PWL is minimized when all firms are
identical, a clear indication that the assumption of identical firms biases the estimation of PWL downwards.
© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
JEL classification: D61; L11; L13; L41; L50
Keywords: Welfare losses; Asymmetric firms; Fixed costs1. Introduction
In his classical contribution Cournot (1838, Chapter
8) established that when the number of firms in a market
tends to infinity, oligopolistic equilibrium tends to per
fect competition. As a corollary, Welfare Losses (WL),
measured as the difference between social welfare in the
contrary are WL significant? (see Hotelling (1938) and
Yarrow (1985) for an early treatment of this problem).
As a first cut to the problem, assume that all firms are
identical and costs and demand are linear. It is easily
calculated that the percentage of WL under Cournot
competition, denoted by PWL, is 1 / (1+n)2 where n is
the number of firms. Thus, despite the fact that monop
o
to
fi
o
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ex
paoptimal and the equilibrium allocation, tend to zero. But,
what happens when the number of firms is finite? Is
perfect competition a good approximation or, on the
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E-mail address: lcorchon@eco.uc3m.es.ly and duopoly entail large PWL this magnitude goes
zero pretty quickly: a market composed by 7 identical
rms (“the seven sisters”) produces a PWL of 1.56%
nly.1 This poses a serious question: were WL system
tically small a simple equilibrium concept like perfect
ompetition may be preferable as a description of mar
ets unless an additional argument is made in favor of
1 This formula shows that once linearity is assumed, as done implicitly
Harberger (1954, Footnote 1), WL seldom goes up to big numbers
cept if the number of firms is very small. A list of other empirical
pers measuring WL in oligopoly can be found in Tullock (2003) p. 2.
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the Cournot model (e.g. that the distribution of the
surplus in Cournot and perfect competition is very dif-
In Section 3 we consider free entry with a fixed cost.
We provide formulae for the maximal and the minimalferent). Moreover, the motivation for public policies
dealing with efficiency is lost under small WL.
Let us first comment on papers that deal with our
problem. McHardy (2000) studies a model with qua-
dratic demand and presents numerical calculations. He
finds that WL can be up to 30% larger than those in the
linear model, which is encouraging but still does not
solve the problem. Anderson and Renault (2003) calcu-
late PWL under the assumptions made above except
that they assume an inverse demand function of the
form p=A bxα, (x is aggregate output and p market
price).2 They do not study if PWL differs substantially
from those in the linear model. Johari and Tsitsiklis
(2005) show that if firms are identical, average costs are
not increasing and the inverse demand function is con-
cave, PWL is bounded above by 1 / (2n+1), which is
still not very large because a market with seven firms
achieves, at least, 93.33% of maximum welfare.
Our paper is a quest for markets where oligopoly
produces large WL. Specifically, the purpose of our
paper is twofold: to provide workable formulae for PWL
which depend, as far as possible, on magnitudes that are
observable.3 And to use these formulae to construct
markets where the Cournot equilibria yields large
PWL.4
In Section 2 we consider the Baseline Model, which
is that of Anderson and Renault. We might expect that
for suitable values of α, WL were much higher than
those in the linear case. However, by using numerical
methods we find that the maximum PWL obtained in
this case is not very different from the one obtained in
the linear case. Moreover, for some values of α, PWL is
arbitrarily small. Thus, the consideration of a more
general class of demand functions does not bring sig-
nificant WL associated with oligopoly, but on the
contrary it adds to the suspicion that WL under oligo-
poly may be small. We then turn our attention to fixed
costs and heterogeneous firms.5
2 This form of demand generalizes both linear (α 1) and isoelastic
(with elasticity of demand 1/α) forms and allows for computation of
equilibria.
3 The parameter α, which might be estimated but it is not observed,
enters in the formula of PWL in Anderson and Renault (2003), so it is
unavoidable in the more general set ups considered in this paper.
4 Johari and Tsitsiklis (2005) offer an example of a market where
PWL is arbitrarily close to one but in which the inverse demand
function is not differentiable.
5 Other attempts to find higher WL focus on issues outside market
competition like “X-Inefficiency”, Leibenstein (1966) and Rent-
Seeking, Tullock (1967).PWL where this magnitude depends on the number of
firms and α. We show that when α and the fixed cost are
not observable, for any exogenously given observation
on market price, output, average variable cost and
number of firms, PWL can be chosen arbitrarily (Propo-
sition 1). In particular when α tends to infinity, PWL can
be chosen to be arbitrarily close to one. This result
implies that any given price-marginal costs margin, or
elasticity of demand, is compatible with any PWL.
When the fixed cost can be observed, the observed
variables must fulfill a condition which implies that
entry is blockaded. We show that any observation ful-
filling this condition is compatible with many but not
all PWL (Proposition 2).
In Section 4 we consider heterogeneous firms. We
provide a formula for PWL where this magnitude de-
pends (positively) on the share of the largest firm,
(negatively) on the Hirschman Herfindahl concentra-
tion index, denoted by H, and on α. We find that there
are markets with a large number of firms where PWL is
close to one whereas H is close to zero (Proposition 3).
This shows that H is not a reliable measure of WL.6
More importantly, it implies that the concept of a large
economy must be taken with care because seemingly
innocuous departs from a model where all firms are
small and identical may have serious welfare conse-
quences. Next, we prove that the market structure that
maximizes PWL is a dominant firm when αN0 and
monopoly when αb0 (Proposition 4). Thus, monopoly,
the target of attacks of our profession from Adam Smith
on, is not necessarily the worst outcome in terms of WL.
Finally we prove that PWL is minimized when firms are
identical (Proposition 5). This shows that proper care of
the heterogeneity of firms is essential to obtain estimates
of PWL that are not biased towards small PWL.
Finally, in Section 5 we offer some thoughts about
our results. Our main conclusion is twofold. On the one
hand, the search for WL in actual markets should focus
on economies of scale and asymmetric firms, two facts
that are seldom considered in the applied literature. On
the other hand the Cournot model can easily produce
large WL. Other important points are the characteriza-
tion of the best and the worst possible market structures
from the welfare point of view when firms are different
6 That social welfare is increasing in the marginal cost of small
firms was first pointed out by Lahiri and Ono (1988). For a criticism
of the idea that concentration is generally bad for social welfare see
Daughety (1990), Farrell and Shapiro (1990) and Cable et al. (1994).
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and the construction of a “large” market where PWL is
arbitrarily close to one.7
From Eq. (2.3), the percentage of WL denoted by
PWL isIt goes without saying that important causes of WL
are not considered here, i.e. product differentiation, in-
vestment, R&D, location, etc. The analysis of the impact
of these variables on WL requires the consideration of
games that are more complicated than those considered
here and, consequently, they are left for future research.
2. The Baseline Model
There is a representative consumer with a utility
function U ¼ Ax bxaþ1aþ1  px where x is aggregate out-
put, p is the market price, bαN0 and αN 1. The maxi-
mization of utility generates an inverse demand function
p=A bxα. Notice that if αb0, bb0, and A=0 we have
an isoelastic function p= bxα. The linear case occurs if
α=1.
There are n identical firms each producing a single
output denoted by xi, i=1, …, n. Thus xu
Pn
i¼1 xi.
Marginal cost is constant and denoted by c. Profits for
firm i are πi≡ (p c)xi. Defining a≡A c we have that
πi≡ (a bxα)xi. Assume abN0 and Aαbcn. These
assumptions guarantee that output and market price are
positive in equilibrium (see Eq. (2.1)).
If firms compete à la Cournot the first order condition
of profit maximization yields a bxα bαxα 1xi=0. It is
easy to check that the second order condition holds and
that equilibrium is symmetric. Thus Cournot equili-
brium output and market price are
x⁎ ¼ an
b nþ að Þ
 1
a
and p⁎¼Aaþ cn
nþa : ð2:1Þ
Social welfare, denoted by W, is the sum of industry
profits and the utility of the representative consumer, i.e.
W ¼ ax b xaþ11þa. The optimal aggregate output is found
by maximizing W, namely
xo ¼ a
b
 1
a
: ð2:2Þ
Social welfare in equilibrium and in the optimal
allocation, are, respectively
W⁎ ¼ a
aþ1
a n
1
aa nþ aþ 1ð Þ
b
1
a nþ að Þaþ1a aþ 1ð Þ
and Wo ¼ a
aþ1
a a
b
1
a aþ 1ð Þ :
ð2:3Þ
7 Other points that have already been noticed in the literature are the
importance of the functional form of demand and the failure of the H
index and the price-marginal cost ratio to capture WL.PWLu
Wo W⁎
Wo
¼ 1 n
1
a nþ aþ1ð Þ
nþ að Þaþ1a
uL a; nð Þ; ð2:4Þ
see Anderson and Renault (2003) p. 262. The following
properties of L(·,·) are easily proved:
i) limn→∞L(α,n)=0.
ii) limα→ 1L(α,n)=0.
iii) limα→∞L(α,n)=0.
iv) L(α,·) decreases with n.
v) L(·,n) is quasi-concave in α.
i) is the usual property of large economies, as noticed
in the Introduction. The explanation of ii) is that when
α→ 1, the market produces in the limit an infinity
amount of surplus, so the loss caused by oligopoly tends
to zero. iii) is caused by the fact that when α→∞,
inverse demand is flat so firms cannot influence price
and optimal and equilibrium output are identical. ii) and/
or iii) imply that there are markets where, for a given n,
PWL is as small as we wish, something that is im-
possible in the case of quadratic utility functions.
iv) shows that, when there are no technological is-
sues at stake, the more competition, the better. Finally
v) follows from the fact that Anderson and Renault
(2003) proved that W o /W⁎ is quasi-concave on α. So
W⁎ /Wo is quasi-convex and W⁎ /W o is quasi-con-
cave, so it is 1 W⁎ /W o.
We now study PWL as a function of α. Table 1 below
shows, for selected values of n, the maximum PWL,
denoted by PWL, and PWL when the demand function
is linear, denoted by PWLL (see Corchón (2006) for
details). Notice that iv) above guarantees that for n
larger than 10, PWL will be smaller than 2.2%.
Notice that the general form of the utility function
does not help much to obtain significant WL. Given this
and that PWL can be much smaller than PWL (i.e. when
α is close to 1 or to ∞) we conclude that the con-
sideration of a more general class of utility functions
alone is not helpful to finding significant WL.
3. Fixed costs and free entry
In this section we assume that in order to produce,
firms must incur a fixed cost, denoted by k, and that there
is an infinity number of potential firms. The number of
active firms in equilibrium is denoted by n. Given n,
output is determined as in the previous section. We
assume that the decision of entry is prior to the decision
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on output.8 Thus, equilibrium under free entry implies
that if n firms are in the market, firm n has non-negative
Minimal PWL, denoted by MI(α, n), occurs for the
minimum value of k, namely
Table 1
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
P
PWL .27 .118 .076 .058 .044 .0357 .032 .027 .024 .022
PWLL .25 .11 .0625 .04 .027 .02 .0156 .012 .01 .008profits but firm (n+1) has non-positive profits, formally
aa
1þa
a n
1 a
a
b
1
a nþ að Þ1þaa
z k z
aa
1þa
a nþ 1ð Þ1 aa
b
1
a nþ aþ 1ð Þ1þaa
: ð3:1Þ
Welfare in a Cournot equilibrium with free entry is
W⁎ ¼ a
aþ1
a n
1
aa nþ aþ 1ð Þ
b
1
a nþ að Þaþ1a aþ 1ð Þ
 nk; ð3:2Þ
where n satisfies Eq. (3.1). When social welfare is
maximized, aggregate output is given by Eq. (2.2). And
the optimal number of firms never exceeds one because
the existence of a fixed cost implies that is optimal to
produce xo in one firm. Thus, social welfare in the
optimal allocation with one firm is
Wo ¼ aa
aþ1
a
b
1
a aþ 1ð Þ  k: ð3:3Þ
Assuming aa
aþ1
a N kb
1
a aþ 1ð Þ, i.e. that the fixed cost
is small enough, one active firm is socially optimal
because it yields more social welfare than no firms. Thus
PWL can be written as
PWL ¼
a
aþ1
a a
b
1
a aþ1ð Þ 
a
aþ1
a n
1
aa nþaþ1ð Þ
b
1
a nþað Þ1þaa aþ1ð Þ
þ n 1ð Þk
a
aþ1
a a
b
1
a aþ1ð Þ  k
: ð3:4Þ
In order to have a formula, in which PWL depends on
observable variables, we substitute k for its upper and
lower bounds in Eq. (3.1). It is clear that PWL is in-
creasing on k. Thus, the maximal PWL, denoted by MA
(α, n), occurs for the maximum value of k, namely
MA a; nð Þ nþað Þ
1þa
a n1a nþaþ1ð Þþ n1ð Þn1 aa aþ1ð Þ
nþ að Þ1þaa n1 aa aþ 1ð Þ
:
ð3:5Þ
8 López-Cuñat (1999) has shown that, under conditions that are met
here, the equilibrium considered in this paper is a subset of an
equilibrium when both decisions are simultaneous (like in Novshek
(1980) and Ushio (1983)).MI a; nð Þu
nþ aþ 1ð Þ1þaa n
1
a nþaþ1ð Þ1þ2aa
nþað Þ1þaa
þ n 1ð Þ nþ 1ð Þ1 aa aþ 1ð Þ
nþ aþ 1ð Þ1þaa nþ 1ð Þ1 aa aþ 1ð Þ
:
ð3:6Þ
We now state the properties of and MA(·,·) and
MI(·,·) that correspond to i) iv) in the previous section.
i') limn→∞MI(α, n)= limn→∞MA(α, n)=0.
ii') limα→ 1MI(α, n)= limα→ 1MA(α, n)=0.
iii') lim aYlMI a; nð Þ ¼ n 1n ; lim aYlMA a; nð Þ ¼ 1:
iv') Neither MI(α,·) nor MA(α,·) are monotonic on n.
i') implies that limk→ 0PWL=0, since Eq. (3.1) im-
plies that when k→0, n→∞. Variations of this result
have been obtained by Dasgupta and Ushio (1981),
Fraysse and Moreaux (1981) and Guesnerie and Hart
(1985). i') and ii') are identical to i) and ii) in the previous
section. However iii') is very different from iii) because it
says that markets with very large α′s could be very
inefficient. For large values of α, the contrast between
monopoly and markets with a large number of firms is
striking: In the former it is possible to construct examples
where PWL is arbitrarily small and in the latter such
examples are not possible. This is due to the fact that
when n is very large, there are large WL due to the
discrepancy between the equilibrium and the optimal
number of firms, which is one. Finally iv') is proved by
means of an example available under request. The reason
for this apparently paradoxical result is that k changes
in order to maintain the free entry condition (3.1).
We now show that, if k and α are unknown, PWL is
arbitrary even if certain variables like price, output,
marginal cost and number of firms are observed and
we require that they correspond to the values in a
Cournot Equilibrium with free entry for some para-
meters defining demand and costs. To formalize this, we
say that a Market is a list of real numbers (A, c, b, α, k)
such that kN0, (A c) αN0, αN 1, αbN0, Aαbcn
and a A cð Þaþ1a Nkb1a aþ 1ð Þ. An Observation is a list
p;xi;c;nð Þ where p is market price, xi is output of
firm i, c bpð Þ is the marginal cost andn is the number
of active firms. The last variable is a positive integer and
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the others are positive real numbers. We assume that c is
observable because under constant returns, the marginal
From the first inequality in Eq. (3.1) (with equality)
and the definition of k it follows that
fcost equals the average variable cost which, in principle,
can be observed (wages, raw materials, etc.). Now we
have the following:
Proposition 1. Given an observation p;xi;c;nð Þ, and
a number v such that v ¼ MA ̂a; nð Þ; ̂aa 1; 0ð Þ [ 0;lð Þ,
there is a market ̂A;c; ̂b; ̂a; ̂k
 
such that p;xi;nð Þ is a
Cournot equilibriumwith free entry for thismarket (i.e. they
fulfill Eqs. (2.1) and (3.1)), and PWL=v.
Proof. For k equal to the maximum value in Eq. (3.1),
PWL is given by Eq. (3.5). Let v and αˆ be such that
MA ̂a;nð Þ ¼ v. Now set
̂A ¼ p nþ ̂að Þ  cn
̂a
; ̂k ¼ ̂a ̂A c
 1þa
a n
1 a
a
̂b
1
a nþ ̂að Þ1þaa
;
̂b ¼
̂A c n
n ̂axâi nþ âð Þ
This system can be solved easily because the first
equation determines Â, the last equation determines bˆ
and with these values of Â and bˆ the remaining equation
determines kˆ. By construction ̂A ̂a ¼ p nþ ̂að Þ  cn,
so ̂A c  ̂a ¼ p nþ âð Þ  c nþ ̂að ÞN0 Then,
from the last equation αˆbˆN0 and the remaining equa-
tion implies kˆ N0. Also ̂A ̂aþ cn ¼ p nþ ̂að ÞN0.
Finally we will show that ̂a ̂A c  aþ1a N ̂k ̂b1a ̂aþ 1ð Þ.
Given the definitions of the parameters, this inequality
reads nþ ̂að Þ1þ aa n1 aa ̂aþ 1ð ÞN0. CallW ̂a;nð Þ the
left hand side of the previous inequality and extend the
function to allow n to take real values. Notice that
W ̂a; 1ð Þ ¼ âþ 1ð Þ ̂aþ 1ð Þ1a1
 
N0. Also limnYlW ̂a;ð
nÞ ¼l. Then, if W ̂a;nð ÞV0 there must be a val-
ue ofn sayn for which AW â;nð Þ
An ¼ 0 andW ̂a;nð ÞV0.
The former is equivalent to nþ ̂að Þ1an ¼n1 aa 1 ̂að Þ.
If αˆ=1 this is impossible. If αˆ≠1 plugging this equa-
tion in the definition of W(·,·) we obtain W ̂a;nð Þ ¼
nþð ̂aÞ1a ̂a1 ̂a  ̂aþ 1 2nð Þ p 0. Thus W â;nð Þb0f
âa 0; 1ð Þ. However for ̂aa 0; 1ð Þ; nþ ̂að Þ1þ aa zn1þ aa , so
W ̂a;nð Þzn1a n 1þ â
n
 
zn
1
a n 2
n
 
N 0. Thus,
W ̂a;nð ÞN0.
Plugging the values of Â and bˆ into Eq. (2.1) we
obtain
x⁎ ¼ ̂A cð Þn
̂b nþ ̂að Þ
 1
a
¼nxi and p⁎ ¼
̂A ̂aþ cn
nþ ̂a
¼ p:̂a ̂A cð Þ1þ aa n1 aa
̂b
1
a nþ ̂að Þ1þ aa
¼ ̂a
̂A c 1þ aa n1 aa
̂b
1
a nþ ̂að Þ1þ aa
n
1 a
a
nþ ̂að Þ1þ aa
¼ n
1 a
a
nþ ̂að Þ1þ aa
;
which has n ¼n as a solution so the proof is
complete. □
There are two main implications of this result. On the
one hand it points out the necessity of a good estimate of
α in order to judge the efficiency of a market. Notice that
first order conditions of profit maximization imply that
the elasticity of demand equals n p cð Þp so neither the
elasticity of demand, nor price-marginal costs margins
are related to α and/or PWL. On the other hand, together
with the second part of iii'), it allows for markets
yielding PWL arbitrarily close to one, the main theo-
retical goal of this paper. The explanation of this, is that
we have constructed a market in which, in equilibrium,
profits are zero and, when tends to infinity, consumer
surplus is also zero since from Eq. (2.1) we have that
U
a
aþ 1ð Þb1a
na
nþ a
 1þa
a
; so lim
aYl
a
aþ 1ð Þb1a
na
nþ a
 1þa
a
0:
The intuition of the latter equation is that large values
of make inverse demand flatter and flatter so con-
sumer surplus goes to zero when α goes to infinity. The
difference with iii) in the previous section where
limα→∞L(α,n)=0 arises from the fact that in the latter
industry profits are not zero, but when α tends to infinity
they tend to α.
We now consider the case where fixed costs are
observable. In this case an observation is a list
p;xi;c;n;tð Þ such thattVxi p cð Þ (i.e. profits
are non-negative). Consider the following condition that
guarantees that no firm will like to enter:
Definition 1. Observation p;xi;c;n;tð Þ and α ful-
fill condition BE (Blockaded Entry) if
nþ aþ 1
nþ a
 1þa
a n
nþ 1
 1 a
a
N
xi p cð Þ
t
:
The right hand side can be interpreted as the rate of
(gross) profits. BE just says that the rate of profits
cannot be larger than a certain number which depends
on α and n. Denote the left hand side of the inequa-
lity above by F n;að Þ. Since it is decreasing in α, a
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sufficient condition for the inequality to hold is that
limaYlF n;að Þ ¼ 1nþ 1 be larger than the rate of
the definition of an observation. And when we plug the
values of Â and bˆ obtained above, the second inequality(gross) profits.
Proposition 2. Given an observation p;xi;c;n;tð Þ
and a number v such that v ¼ MI ̂a;nð Þ; ̂aa 1; 0ð Þ[
0;lð Þ, if BE holds, there is a market ̂A;c; ̂b; ̂a;t  such
that p;xi;nð Þ is a Cournot equilibrium with free entry
for this market (i.e. they fulfill Eqs. (2.1) and (3.1)), and
PWL≥v.
Proof. (Virtually identical to the proof of Proposition 1).
For k equal to the minimum value in Eq. (3.1), PWL is
given by Eq. (3.6). Choose αˆ such that v ¼ MI ̂a;nð Þ.
Set
̂A ¼ p nþ ̂að Þ  cn
̂a
; ̂b ¼ ̂A cð Þn
n âx âi nþ ̂að Þ
Plugging these values of Â and bˆ into Eq. (2.1) we
obtain the required values of x⁎ and p⁎. Finally, the left
hand side of the free entry condition Eq. (3.1) holds by
4. Non-identical firmsSuppose that firms have different costs. Let c be the margin
Kiyono (1987).of Eq. (3.1) reads
tz
xi p cð Þ nþ ̂að Þ
1þ ̂a
a nþ1
n
 1 ̂a
a
nþ ̂aþ 1ð Þ1þ ̂aa
;
which under BE holds. When the above equation holds
with equality, PWL ¼ MI ̂a;nð Þ ¼ v; so PWLzv. □
Comparing these with the results obtained in the
previous section we see that the consideration of fixed
costs allows the possibility of finding large PWL. This is
because in this case, we add the misallocation due to the
wrong number of firms to the misallocation due to the
wrong output. The former comes up to very large num-
bers because in our model the optimal number of firms is
one.9 But preferences play a role too: In the linear case,
values of PWL arbitrarily close to one cannot be obtained
for a given n. The reason is that the utility of the repre-
sentative consumer when α=1 is always positive.al cost of firm i. Without loss of generality let c ≤c fori 1 i
all i. Let ai≡A ci. We will assume that for all i, (n+α 1)aiN∑j≠ iaj, b∑j 1n ajN0 and Aαb∑i 1n ci. These
assumptions imply that, in equilibrium, all firms produce a positive output and market price is positive (see Eq. (4.1)
below). Cournot equilibrium is easily shown to be unique and given by
x⁎i ¼
1
a
Pn
j¼1 aj
b nþ að Þ
 !1
a
ai nþ að ÞPn
j¼1 aj
 1
 !
; x⁎ ¼
Pn
j¼1 aj
b nþ að Þ
 !1
a
and p* ¼ Aaþ
Pn
i¼1 ci
nþ a : ð4:1Þ
Social welfare is W ¼ Ax b xaþ1aþ1 
Pn
i¼1 cixi ¼
Pn
i¼1 aixi  b x
aþ1
aþ1. In equilibrium,
W⁎ ¼ 1
a
Xn
i¼1
ai
Pn
j¼1 aj
b nþ að Þ
 !1
a
ai nþ að ÞPn
j¼1 aj
 1
 !
 b
aþ 1
Pn
i¼1 ai
b nþ að Þ
 aþ1
a
; ð4:2Þ
which when all ai's are identical reduces to Eq. (2.3). In the optimal allocation only the technology in the hands of Firm
1 is used and accordingly
xo ¼ a1
b
 1
a
andWo ¼ aa
aþ1
a
1
aþ 1ð Þb1a : ð4:3Þ
9 Overentry may also occur even if the marginal cost is increasing, see von Weizsäcker (1980), Mankiw and Whinston (1986) and Suzumura and6
In order to have a workable expression for PWL that depends on observable variables alone, let us define si as the
market share of firm i. Clearly, ∑i 1n si=1 and s1≥ si, i=2,…, n. Then, from Eq. (4.1),siu
xi
x
¼ ai nþ að Þ 
Pn
j¼1 aj
a
Pn
j¼1 aj
Z ai ¼
asi þ 1ð Þ
Pn
j¼1 aj
nþ a : ð4:4Þ
We will say that a list of market shares (s1, s2, … ,sn) is a Market Structure. It is clear from Eq. (4.4) that any vector
(a1, a2, …,an) yields a unique market structure compatible with Cournot equilibrium and that given a market structure
we can construct a vector (a1, a2, … ,an) (in fact an infinity number of vectors) whose Cournot equilibrium yields this
market structure. Given this, we will focus on market structure that has the advantage of being observable.
Plugging the last part of Eq. (4.4) into Eq. (4.2) and after lengthy calculations we obtain PWL as a function of and
the market structure, namely
PWL¼ 1þ as1ð Þ
aþ1
a aþ 1ð ÞPni 1 s2i 1
1þ as1ð Þ
aþ1
a
P s1;
Xn
i 1
s2i ; a
 !
: ð4:5Þ
When all firms are identical, Eq. (4.5) reduces to Eq. (2.4). It is noteworthy that PWL here depends only on three
variables:
α.
The market share of the largest firm s1.
The Hirschman Herfindahl index of concentration denoted by H≡∑i 1n si2.10
Eq. (4.5) allows computation of PWL from s1 and H assuming that demand is linear or isoelastic (where α is the
inverse elasticity of demand). It also allows to plot PWL as a function of α for actual market structures and see what thissimple application to the Spanish gasoline market.function looks like, see Corchón (2006), pp. 16 17 for a
Notice the following properties of P( ) as defined by Eq. (4.5):11
i") limα→ 1P(s1, H, α)=0.
ii") limaYlP s1;H ; að Þ ¼ 1s1 s1 
Pn
i¼1 s
2
i
 
:
iii") P(·, H, α) is increasing on s1.
iv") P (s1, ·, α) is decreasing on H.
v") limaY0PWL s1;H ; a
  ¼ e s1 1 Hes1 :
i") is identical to ii).When firms are identical ii") reduces to iii). Point iii) agreeswith the receivedwisdom: the larger the
dominant firm, the closer to monopoly, and hence the larger the PWL is. However, iv") is counterintuitive because it says
the larger the concentration, the lower the WL. The reason is that when H increases, production is shifted to the less
efficient firms which causes social welfare to fall. Finally v") allows us to extend P(s1,H,·) to α=0 preserving continuity.
We now discuss why the approach followed in the previous section will not work here. An Observation is a list
p;x1; N ;xn;c1; N ;cnð Þwherep is market price andxi andci bpð Þ are the output and the marginal cost of firm i.
A Market is a list (A, c1,…, cn, b, α) such that (n+α 1)aiN∑j≠ iaj, αN 1, b∑j 1najN0, bαN0, and Aαb∑i 1n ci.
Clearly, not all observations are compatible with the model. In particular, the number of variables in an observation is 2n
+1 and the number of parameters defining a market is n+3. With nN2, the number of parameters will be, in general,
unable to generate the required observations. Also, first order conditions of profit maximization imply that
xi
xj
¼ p ci
p cj :
This relation may fail even for the case n=2. Given this, we will study how PWL depends on α, n and the market
structure focussing our attention on limiting cases, i.e. when PWL is maximal or minimal. Our first result is that when
10 In fact, s1 and H are not independent but we prefer to write Eq. (4.5) in this way to highlight the role of H in the formula.
11 As we mentioned before, we take s1 and H as independent when in fact they are not.
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α, n, and the market structure can be chosen simultaneously, PWL can be arbitrarily close to one and at the same time
the concentration index H arbitrarily low.Proposition 3. There exists (α, n, s1,…, sn) for which PWL is arbitrarily close to one and H is arbitrarily close to zero.
Proof. From iv") the maximal PWL occurs when s2= s3= ,…,= sn. Denoting these shares by y, we have that s1+ (n 1)
y=1. Plugging this in Eq. (4.5) we have that
P s1; n; að Þ
1þ as1ð Þ
aþ1
a  aþ 1ð Þ s21 þ 1 s1ð Þ
2
n 1
 
 1
1þ as1ð Þ
aþ1
a
: ð4:6Þ
PWL is increasing on n so the maximum PWL obtains when n is arbitrarily large, i.e.
lim
nYl
P s1; n; að Þ ¼ 1þ as1ð Þ
aþ1
a  aþ 1ð Þs21  1
1þ as1ð Þ
aþ1
a
: ð4:7Þ
We easily compute limα→∞limn→∞P(s1, n, α)= limn→∞ limα→∞P(s1, n, α)=1 s1. Thus when α and n are very
large and s1 very small, PWL is arbitrarily close to one (since limits are interchangeable our procedure is robust).
The restriction s1≥ si, i=2, …, n when firms 2, …, n are identical, is equivalent to ns1≥1. This inequality
holds when the order of magnitude at which n tends to ∞ is larger than the order of magnitude at which s1 tends
to 0.
Finally, it can be easily shown that when firms 2 to n are identical,
H ¼ ns
2
1 þ 1 2s1
n 1 ¼
s21 þ 1n 2 s1n
1 1n
;
which when n→∞ and s1→0 tend to zero. □
From the previous proof it follows that for n and α large, PWLg1 Hp which highlights the point made before
about the relationship between concentration and WL.
It can be shown that if one of the variables in our construction is held fixed, PWL can be made large, but not close to
one, and H is again far from being a reliable measure of PWL, see Corchón (2006) pp. 19 21. We now perform a more
demanding exercise where PWL is studied by varying only one variable, either the market structure or α.
We first concentrate on how market shares affect PWL. A market structure such that s1N s2= ,…,= snN0 will be
called a Dominant Firm. A limit case of a dominant firm is Monopoly where only s1 is positive.
Proposition 4. For αN0, PWL is maximized when the market structure is a dominant firm with s1 ¼ nþ32nþ2 if a ¼
1 and s1 ¼ n 1þ 1þanþa2nþan2
p
an n if ap1. For αb0 the market structure that maximizes PWL is monopoly.
Proof. The maximum of PWL in Eq. (4.5) over ∑i 1n si=1 exists (by Weierestrass' theorem). As mentioned before, it
occurs when s2= s3= ,…,= sn. So, let us consider PWL as given by Eq. (4.6). The extrema of this expression with respect
to s1 can be located, either when
AP s1;n;að Þ
As1
¼ 0 or in the bounds of the interval in which s1 must lie, namely sj≤ si≤1
for all jN1. Since (n 1)sj≤ s1 the previous inequality can be written as 1nVs1V1. Now, rewrite Eq. (4.6) as follows:
P s1; n; að Þ ¼ 1
aþ 1ð Þ ns21  2s1 þ 1
 þ n 1
n 1ð Þ 1þ as1ð Þ
aþ1
a
:
AP
As1
s21 n na
2ð Þ s1 2þ2nþ2aþ2nað Þþ2þa 3þnþað Þþn
n 1ð Þ as1 þ 1ð Þ
1
aþ2
ð4:8Þ
AP
As1
¼ 0fs21 n na2
  ¼ 2s1 1þ nþ aþ nað Þ  2 a 3þ nþ að Þ  n ð4:9Þ
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We have three possible cases: If α=1, the solution to Eq. (4.9) is s⁎1 ¼ nþ32nþ2a 1n ; n
	 

. Then, the maximum must be
located either at s ¼ 1, at s =1 or at s ¼ nþ3 . We easily compute,1 n 1 1 2nþ2
P 1; n; 1ð Þ ¼ 1
4
; P
1
n
; n; 1
 
¼ 1
nþ 1ð Þ2 ; P
nþ 3
2nþ 2 ; n; 1
 
¼ nþ 1
3nþ 5 :
From these expressions we obtain that the maximum occurs at s1 ¼ nþ32nþ2.
If αN1 from the first order condition we obtain two solutions,
s⁎1 ¼
n 1F 1þ anþ a2nþ an2p
an n : ð4:10Þ
Clearly only the solution with a plus sign in front of the square root is feasible. We will show that for this solution
s⁎1a
1
n ; 1
	 

. If 1nNs
⁎
1 we would have α
2(n 1)+n2(α 1) αn+1b0 which is impossible because the left hand side
achieves a minimum when n=2 and α=1. Similarly, if s1⁎ N1, αn α n+1b0, which again is impossible.
Finally, notice that since there is only one value of s1 for which
AP s1;n;að Þ
As1
¼ 0 the shape of P(·,n, α) is determined by
the sign of AP s1;n;að Þ
As1
at s1 ¼ 1n and s1=1. From Eq. (4.8),
sign
AP 1n ; n; a
 
As1
¼ sign nþ aþ na 1
n
þ a2 2
n
a
1
n
a2
 
ð4:11Þ
which is positive because the expression on the right hand side is increasing in α and for α= 1 equals to zero. Also
from Eq. (4.8) we obtain that
sign
AP 1; n; að Þ
As1
¼ sign a naþ a2  na2  ¼ sign a 1þ að Þ 1 nð Þð Þ ð4:12Þ
which is negative so the interior solution is indeed a maximum.
Finally let us consider the case αb1. Suppose that the negative root in Eq. (4.10) is less than one. Then
n 1 1þ anþ a2nþ an2p
an n b1 f 1þ anþ a
2nþ an2
p
Nanþ 1;
which is impossible. So there is, at most, one interior solution. Suppose first that αN0. From Eqs. (4.11) (4.12) we get
that sign
AP 1n;n;að Þ
As1
is positive and sign AP 1;n;að Þ
As1
is negative which implies that maximum PWL is achieved at the interior
solution. If α=0 the positive root in Eq. (4.10) equals one. Finally, if αb0, from Eqs. (4.11) (4.12), we have that
sign
AP 1n;n;að Þ
As1
and sign AP 1;n;að Þ
As1
are both positive which given that there is, at most one value of s1 for which sign
AP ;n;að Þ
As1
switches from positive to negative means that P(·, n, α) is increasing, so it achieves the maximum when s1=1. □
Proposition 4 says that the most deleterious market structure is not always monopoly, the target of the
wrath of economists since Adam Smith. In many cases a dominant firm structure is worse because firms other than
Firm 1 do not add much competition to the market because they are technologically inefficient. We notice that under
maximal PWL,
H ¼ ns
2
1 þ 1 2s1
n 1 and PWL ¼
1þ as1ð Þ
aþ1
a  aþ 1ð Þ ns21 þ 1 s1ð Þ
2
n 1
 
 1
1þ as1ð Þ
aþ1
a
;
so H decreases with n but PWL increases with n. And H increases with s1 but PWL not necessarily so. Thus, again, the
concentration index H is a poor measure of WL.
The maximum PWL for given n and α is obtained by plugging the value of s1 that maximizes PWL as found in
Proposition 4 and denoted by s(α, n), into P(s1, n, α). Let P(s(α, n), n, α)≡F(α, n), say.
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It can be shown thatF(α,·) is increasing in nwhich implies that, for any number of firms, it is possible to find the PWL of,
at least, F(α, 2) which for values of α∈ (0, 50] never goes below 0.2097. Finally, we state two limiting properties of F(·,·):limaYl Fða; nÞ ¼ ð n
p Þ3 þ np  2n
ð np Þ3  np :
limnYl F a; nð Þ ¼ 1 ð a
p  1Þ2 þ aþ 1ð Þ þ a 1ð Þ2
a 1ð Þa 1a ða ap  1Þaþ1a
Notice that in both cases PWL is high even for small values of α and n. It is clear that limn→∞, α→∞F(α, n)=
limα→∞, n→∞F(α, n)=1.
We now turn to the study of the market structure that minimizes PWL.
Lemma 1. Suppose that ̂s1; ̂s2; N ; ̂snð Þ minimizes P(s1, ∑i 1n si2, α). Then Zŝi; ŝj; j N1 such that ŝ1NŝizŝjN0.
Proof. Increasing ̂si by a small amount, say dx, and decreasing ̂sj by dx too is feasible i.e. ̂si þ dx and
̂sj  dxa 0; s1½ , increases H and so decreases PWL which contradicts that is minimized. □
Lemma 1 implies that only three market structures might minimize PWL: 1) All firms produce the same output 2)
All firms minus one, say n, produce the same output. 3) A number of firms, say 1, …, m with mbn produce the same
output, and the remaining firms produce zero output. But the last option cannot minimize PWL since it was established
that when all firms are identical, PWL decreases with the number of (active) firms (Property iv) in Section 2). So we are
left with options 1 and 2.
Proposition 5. The market structure that minimizes PWL is when all firms produce the same output.
Proof. Notice that market structures in 1) and 2) above can be written as (x, x, …, 1 (n 1)x) with xa 1n 1 ;
1
n
	 

, where
the lower bound of this interval comes from 1≥ (n 1)x. In this case H=(n 1)x2 + (1 (n 1)x)2. Plugging H into
Eq. (4.5) we obtain
PWL¼ 1
aþ 1ð Þ n 1ð Þx2 þ 1 n 1ð Þxð Þ2
 
þ 1
1þ axð Þaþ1a
uPW a; x; nð Þ:
Now, computing APW a;x;nð Þ
Ax this expression is found to be equal to
 1þ að Þ
1þ xað Þ1þaa
2n2x 2nx 2nþ 2
1þ að Þ n 1ð Þx2 þ 1 n 1ð Þxð Þ2
 
þ 1
1þ xa
2
4
3
5
Solving for APW a;x;nð Þ
Ax ¼ 0 we obtain the following. If α=1,
APW a; x; nð Þ
Ax
¼ 0f4nþ 4xþ 2 4n2x ¼ 0fx ¼ 2nþ 1
2n2  2b
1
n 1 :
So only boundary solutions are feasible and PWL is minimized when x ¼ 1n. If α≠1,
APW a; x; nð Þ
Ax
¼ 0fx ¼ n
2 þ 1F n4 þ 1þ 2an3 þ a2n2  3an2  a2n 2n3 þ anp
a 1ð Þ n2  nð Þ :
Suppose that αN1. Clearly, the negative root is not feasible, so consider the positive root, say x⁎. If x⁎V 1n, it must be
that (n 1) (α2 +αn 1 n)≤0 which for nN2 and αN1 is impossible.
Suppose that αb1. If the negative root is less than or equal to 1n, we have that n4 þ 1þ 2an3 þ a2n2 3an2 a2n 2n3 þ an
p
z
nþ að Þ n 1ð Þ which is impossible. Take the positive root. If this root is larger than or equal to 1n 1, then n 1 að ÞVa2 
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3aþ 2 or nV a2 3aþ21 a . The right hand side of this inequality has amaximum at 3 when α→ 1. Since this value of is never
actually achieved, this inequality only may hold when n=2. But APW a;0:5;2ð Þ
Ax ¼ 0:5aþ1:50:5aþ1 N0 which means that the minimum
is achieved at the boundaries of x. Since in this case these bounds imply monopoly and duopoly, by iv) in Section 2 we
achieve the desired result. □
An implication of Proposition 5 is that disregarding firms heterogeneity stacks the deck in favour of small WL.
Also, minimal PWL is given by the function L(·,·) in Eq. (2.4). Recall that maximal PWL is given by the function
F(α,·) (defined in the second paragraph after the end of Proposition 4). Notice that since L(α,·) is decreasing
in n and F(α,·) is increasing in n, the difference between maximal and minimal PWL increases with n for a given
α. Also, since P(·, n, α) is continuous in s1, any PWL between L(α, n) and F(α, n) is reachable by the choice
of s1.
Finally we consider the effect of α alone on PWL. We have little to say about the value of α that maximizes
PWL because first order condition of maximization with respect to α is not very informative. However, the continuity
of P(s1, n, ·) has an interesting implication. Let Vumax s1 Hs1 ;
1þs1ð Þ2 2H 1
1þs1ð Þ2 ;
e s1 1 H
e s1
n o
. The values in the bracket are
respectively, limα→∞P(s1, n, α), P(s1, n, 1) and P(s1, n, 0). Then, we have:
Corollary 1. Any PWL∈ (0, V) is obtainable by the choice of α.
5. Final comments 2. Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) foundmarkets where, as
the number of firms increased beyond three, theWhen one observes public policies on oligopolies one competitive effect of additional firms on average
sees some concern about the number and the relative size
of firms. But the question of the output set by oligopolists
is cause of little or no concern at all. This paper provides
some justification to this attitude: We found that WL due
to the divergence between equilibrium and optimal output
are small, even with as few as five firms in the market as
shown in Section 2. On the contrary WL due to the
number and relative size of firms can be quite substantive
as found in Sections 3 and 4. This conclusion, though, is
likely to be exaggerated by our assumption that the
optimal number of firms is one. Other important factors
are the consideration of product differentiation and other
solution concepts, e.g. Bertrand or Stackelberg equilibria,
see Cable et al. (1994) for the case of duopoly and
quadratic utility. In fact, two of the main conclusions of
Cable et al. (1994, p. 98) are that “the particular form of
oligopolistic interaction exerts a major influence on the
level of welfare” and “the power of inter-firm rivalry to
further social welfare is highly sensitive to the degree of
product differentiation in the market” (pp. 98 9). More-
over, in a dynamic frameworkWL can be larger than here
because firmsmay collude. Thus, our results are just a first
cut to the problem.
Our results have a number of implications for the
applied literature.
1. TomeasureWLdue to oligopolistic output settingmay
be misguided because these losses are likely to be
small. HoweverWL due to overentry or to asymmetric
firms can be quite substantial. Lack of consideration of
these points biases downwards our estimates of WL.markups was exhausted, a fact that suggests that the
outcome is very close to perfect competition. A
possible explanation for their findings is that they
considered markets where asymmetries and econo-
mies of scale were possibly small (i.e. doctors,
dentists, druggists, plumbers and tire dealers). In
contrast, Campbell and Hopenhayn (2002) find that
this competitive effect persists with a large number
of firms in markets were firms are asymmetric (and
the product is differentiated). Our findings in this
paper may help to understand the difference in
results in these two papers.
3. The impact of mergers and collusive agreements on
social welfare depends on the characteristics of the
market. For instance, with identical firms and no
fixed costs our results in Section 2 suggest that anti-
trust authorities should not be very concerned with
mergers that do not bring the number of competing
firms below, say five. However merging from
duopoly to monopoly approximately doubles PWL.
If firms are not identical or there are fixed costs,
traditional measures of concentration fail to capture
the full size of WL.
4. WL depend crucially on the parameter α that cannot
be observed, but might be estimated. Our results point
out the importance of the estimation of α for the
proper account of WL. This may be problematic
because to say something empirical about the local
(around the actual price) characteristics of the demand
curve sounds reasonable, but our approach requires
global information about those characteristics.
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